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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we consider ethical and philosophical aspects of trust in the practice of 
medicine. We focus on trust within the patient-physician relationship, trust and professionalism, 
and trust in Western (allopathic) institutions of medicine and medical research. Philosophical 
approaches to trust contain important insights into medicine as an ethical and social practice. In 
what follows we explain several philosophical approaches and discuss their strengths and 
weaknesses in this context. We also highlight some relevant empirical work in the section on 
trust in the institutions of medicine (cf. Ozawa and Sripad 2013). It is hoped that the approaches 
discussed here can be extended to nursing and other topics in the philosophy of medicine (see 
Dinç and Gastmans 2013).  
 
 
2. Trust and the Physician-Patient Relationship 
 
The idea of the trusting physician-patient relationship is important to medical ethics, and is 
thought by some to be foundational (Beauchamp and Childress 2013; Pellegrino 1999; Zaner 
1991; Rhodes and Strain 2000). The physician-patient relationship contains inherent inequalities 
of knowledge, skills, and control of resources, and it treats matters both intimate and potentially 
of great importance to the patient. In these matters the patient often needs confidentiality and 
discretion. Because of these factors, the idea that trust is necessary for the relationship to be 
healthy is plausible, and it has been remarkably resilient even while the technological and 
institutional complexity of medical practice has vastly increased, and even while the basic norms 
of the practice have shifted from a paternalistic model to one of information-sharing and 
participatory decision-making. The resilience of the idea may also be linked to trust’s utility in 
reducing complexity through such transitions: if one trusts one’s physician, the resulting division 
of epistemic labor allows the patient to divert scarce attentional resources elsewhere (see Miller 
and Freiman in this volume). One could even go so far as to assert that without the existence of 
some level of trust in physicians’ competence and good will, the practice of medicine would not 
be possible because patients would be unwilling to seek medical care.ii 
  
Medical ethics, in keeping with this picture, often models the trusting physician-patient 
relationship as one in which the physician (the GP, in particular) serves as the trusted 
gatekeeper for other practices such as delivery of diagnostic and prognostic information, 
prescription medication, referral to specialists, and the use of technologies for self-care 
(Voerman and Nickel 2017). Much less frequently studied is physicians’ trust in patients, e.g., to 
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deliver accurate information and to follow through on care routines (Entwistle and Quick 2006). 
Physicians’ trust in patients is a natural counterpart to patients’ trust in physicians if we consider 
the trusting patient-physician relationship as mutual or reciprocal; however, asymmetries of 
expertise and control have often led medical ethicists to neglect it. The physician-patient 
relationship, like relationships between other sorts of professionals and their clients, is an 
asymmetrical fiduciary relationship in which one person is given control over an aspect of 
another person in some domain, and is obligated to act for the good of the other, putting their 
own interests second (Rodwin 1995).  
  
In medical ethics, the interest in deriving ethical conclusions from reflection about the nature of 
the physician-patient relationship has led to a particular focus on the values and normativity 
associated with trust. Philosophically there is more than one way of trying to analyze this 
normativity. In order to clarify some promising lines of inquiry, we draw a distinction between 
three types of theories: supporting-relations accounts, grounded-expectation accounts and 
moral-adequacy accounts. 
 
The supporting-relations account starts with the assumption that a trusting relationship is good 
and tries instrumentally to derive the value of other practices supporting trust. For example, 
Zaner (1991) argues that a trusting patient-physician relationship is a basic good, and that 
empathy and perspective-taking are required to support it, and are therefore important ethical 
capacities for physicians.  
 
Trusting relationships, indeed, are often goods to be strived for. However, for reasons put 
forward by Baier (1986) and more recently for the medical context by Hawley (2015), it must be 
admitted that they are not always beneficial. Trust can provide a fertile ground for exploitation 
and manipulation, it can be epistemically poorly grounded, and it can lead to unreasonable 
demands by those who trust, along with unreasonable efforts to meet these demands by those 
who are trusted. For these reasons, any account needs to take a stand on what makes some 
instances of trust good or justified, and others bad or unjustified. That task is addressed by the 
second and third accounts we consider. 
  
Grounded-expectation accounts hold that whether trust is good or justified depends on whether 
the expectations implicit in one’s trust — for example, the expectation that my physician will 
prescribe me the best medicine for treating my illness — are based on sound or unsound 
reasons. Such an account emphasizes that people take on moral responsibilities by creating 
expectations in others. Tim Scanlon (1998: 300) expresses the relevant moral principle as 
follows: “One must exercise due care not to lead others to form reasonable but false 
expectations about what one will do when one has good reason to believe that they would suffer 
significant loss as a result of relying on these expectations.” Scanlon’s principle is about reliance 
rather than trust, but it can be extended to trust because it is even more exploitative or 
manipulative to create false expectations in another person when they are relying on one 
trustingly, than when they are relying on one strategically or reluctantly (see Goldberg in this 
volume). On a grounded-expectation account, physicians take on responsibilities by creating 
expectations of professionalism, expertise, and commitment to promoting the health and well-
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being of the patient. They must then exercise due care to live up to the expectations they have 
created. 
 
A grounded-expectations account can also add the claim, put forward by Manson and O’Neill 
(2007), that patients can and should place their trust intelligently, by making sure that their 
expectations are well-informed: “Trust is well placed when it is given to trustworthy claims and 
commitments, and ill placed when it is given to untrustworthy claims and commitments” (160).  
This implies that intelligent trust is based on cues that are reliably or rationally linked with 
trustworthiness: “Anyone who seeks to place and refuse trust intelligently must try to 
discriminate the various claims and commitments that agents make. I may trust a genetic 
diagnosis if it is based on reputable tests … but not if it is based on quirky views of heredity” 
(ibid.: 165). Implicit in Manson and O’Neill’s example are two importantly different kinds of 
objects of trust within the patient-physician relationship: one is the physician herself, and the 
other is the medical care that she mediates and for which she is the gatekeeper, including such 
items as genetic tests. Other versions of the grounded-expectations account stress the 
importance of social context, including institutions and technology, in grounding people’s 
trusting expectations. Rather than focusing primarily on the agency and intelligence of the 
patient in placing trust, the focus is on the broader idea of “sound” or “healthy” trust, in which the 
patient’s environment guides and provides epistemic grounding for her expectations. By 
providing institutions and informational cues that reliably “track” trustworthiness, policymakers 
and designers facilitate sound trust (Voerman and Nickel 2017). (See O'Neill on “Intelligent 
Trust” and Scheman on trust and trustworthiness in this volume.) 
 
A positive feature of grounded-expectation accounts is that they derive conclusions in medical 
ethics from the normativity of commitments and expectations, not directly from controversial 
ethical theories or domain-specific medical ethics principles. However, it is doubtful whether 
such accounts are sufficient to include all the moral features that contribute to a healthy trust 
relationship. According to Annette Baier (1992) the idea of reasonable expectation-formation 
cannot distinguish between healthy and unhealthy trust relationships because one person can 
trust another reasonably as the result of unfair power relationships that give her few other 
options. In this way, a person’s reasonable expectations can be exploited or rendered fragile in 
ways that do not actually render the expectations themselves unreasonable or unjustified. Baier 
(1992) also holds that the expectations-based view is too rigid to account for what matters to 
trusting relationships. A physician who faultlessly lives up to a list of expectations but fails to 
care for the patient in a broader sense is less trustworthy than a physician who uses her 
discretion wisely to promote the wellbeing of the patient but fails to perform exactly as expected 
along the way.  
 
That is where moral-adequacy accounts exhibit their strength. They hold that there are norms 
for the moral decency of trusting relationships that do not derive from expectations. Baier’s view, 
for example, proposes a transparency test of the moral decency of trust, meant to distinguish 
between exploitative and non-exploitative trust. According to this test, “trust is morally decent 
only if, in addition to whatever else is entrusted, knowledge of each party’s reasons for confident 
reliance on the other to continue the relationship could in principle also be entrusted” (Baier 
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1986: 128). Other versions of the moral adequacy account focus on other adequacy tests of 
trust. For example, Carolyn McLeod’s (2002) theory of trust, developed in part to analyze trust in 
medicine, holds that trust is morally adequate when it is based on shared values and moral 
integrity. We may need to tweak these accounts when applying them to trust in the institutions 
of medicine rather than in individuals (a kind of trust we discuss in section 4). However, the 
argument stands that an individual could sometimes have good pragmatic and epistemic 
reasons to trust the institution of medicine as well as to trust individual physicians, even if the 
both the institution and the physicians within it were exploitative in their motives. We therefore 
need a further moral test to determine morally sound trust in both kinds of entities. 
 
We advocate a hybrid account that sees both grounded expectations and moral adequacy as 
part of sound, healthy trust in medicine. Developing a moral adequacy test in more detail and 
applying it to this context is a task for future research. Yet, a moral-adequacy account centered 
on a narrow conception of the patient-physician relationship may not be the best approach for 
accommodating the technological and institutional transformations of the practice of medicine in 
the long term, which may depart substantially from this conception. For example, Baier’s theory, 
by focusing on a mutual awareness test of the moral decency of trust, presupposes that trust 
obtains between two agents who are each able to form an explicit awareness of the 
expectations and motivations of the other. In the future it may increasingly be the case that 
there is no such relationship at the heart of the institution of medicine, and that a relationship-
based test is therefore inapplicable to trust in medicine. We return to this scenario at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
 
3. Trustworthiness and Professionalism 
 
Professionalism is a phenomenon in which a group of experts who engage in some field of 
practical activity (education and research, law, medicine, engineering, etc.) develop a shared 
identity with official standards for membership and a measure of exclusiveness in having the 
right to evaluate one another’s work. Often, professions adopt internal codes of ethical 
principles (Davis 1991). One line of research in medical ethics has linked professionalism and 
professional ethics to the trustworthiness of physicians and by extension, trust in them 
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993; Manson and O’Neill 2007; Banks and Gallagher 2008; Kelly 
2018). The underlying idea is that the development and continuing identity of professions has, 
as one of its main purposes, to signal trustworthiness to those who turn to the profession in a 
situation of need.  
 
Traditionally, the professional ideals of medicine were uniquely paternalistic among the 
professions. Yet when the paternalistic ideal of the practice of medicine was superseded by an 
ideal of shared decision making and respect for patient autonomy, trust did not become less 
important to the practice of medicine. This seems to suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that while 
trust is essentially bound up with professionalism, it is not strongly affected by the balance of 
decision making and openness between the professional and the one seeking the professional’s 
services. 
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These normative ideals of professionalism suggest that the appropriate default attitude towards 
the medical profession is one of trust. Kelly (2018) presents a systematic theory of the ethics of 
trust and professionalism, arguing that medicine has an internal functional end or telos, relating 
to a basic human need (health care) in which people have to rely on others’ expertise, and that 
as a consequence, trust and trustworthiness are constitutive goods linked to the medical 
profession. For Kelly, professions are required, first, to sustain internal standards of behavior 
and expertise; and second, to guard the reputation of qualified professionals. Both conditions 
are essential in the long run for maintaining widespread trustworthiness in individual physicians 
(2018: 63). For Kelly, it is therefore insufficient to focus on the doctor-patient relationship alone 
as the principal source of the normativity of trust and trustworthiness. 
 
However, the normative ideals of professions themselves bear scrutiny. Critics argue that a 
more realistic view of the relationship between patient and physician is that between customer 
and supplier. Since the 1970s medical professionals, historians, sociologists and ethicists have 
observed and sometimes lamented a shift, spurred by changes in the structure of health care 
delivery, towards rising costs, increased specialization, an expanding role for technology in 
medical care, and an increasing presence of direct-to-consumer marketing of pharmaceuticals 
(cf. Reeder 1972 and Friedler 1997). On this view, not trust, but contractual obligations, 
oversight, and enforceable regulations should guarantee the customer-patient a high quality of 
care.iii 
 
One may thus argue that taking a selective and strategic attitude toward reliance, or even taking 
a default attitude of distrust, might be more rational than taking a default attitude of trust. Recent 
philosophical work provides a substantive account of distrust that distinguishes it from mere lack 
of trust. On Hawley’s (2014) view, distrust is a matter of regarding the distrusted party as being 
committed to meet certain standards, while also finding that this party fails to meet those 
standards. (See D'Cruz in this volume.) Such a default attitude of distrust could be justified on a 
variety of grounds. Worries about meeting a commitment to competence and due care, for 
example, may be bolstered by the prevalence of medical errors. In the United States alone, 
medical errors have been estimated in the past to be responsible for between 44,000 and 
98,000 unnecessary deaths each year (Weingart et al. 2000). Distrust could also be justified if 
the general public has reasons to believe physicians fail to meet commitments to ethical 
impartiality, by being biased in their prescription of certain pharmaceuticals or having financial 
interests in performing certain kinds of procedures. For comparison, it is useful to consider the 
financial professions, where widespread misconduct has made it plausible to claim that a default 
attitude of distrust in banking and investment firms is warranted. If this were to happen in the 
field of medicine, then distrust in the profession could threaten trust in individual physicians. iv 
 
 
4. Trust in the Institutions of Medicine 
 
The institutions of medicine include pharmaceutical companies, public health agencies, health 
insurers and other managed care providers, as well as hospitals, physician professional 
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organizations like the American Pediatric Association, etc. Hall et al. (2001: 620) point out that 
people’s trust or distrust in one of these entities can impact their trust or distrust in the others in 
a wide range of ways. Although there is a large empirical literature aimed at measuring and 
understanding patients' levels of trust in individual care providers, like their primary care doctor 
or their nurse, there has been less empirical research on trust in medical institutions or the 
medical profession as a whole. 
 
There is a sharp difference between trust in the institutions of medicine and trust in particular 
physicians. This is due to two key features of institutions: unspecificity and impersonality. There 
is broad consensus on the kinds of things patients expect their physicians to do and be, 
including but not limited to acting beneficently, maintaining their knowledge and skills; protecting 
patient confidentiality; respecting patient autonomy, etc. (Mechanic 1996, Rhodes 2007). These 
expectations may arise from both personal knowledge of the physician, as well as an 
awareness of what they stand for as medical professionals. For institutions of medicine, these 
expectations and the obligations they ascribe to different actors become more unspecific, since 
we are discussing a wide variety of roles and groups, governed by varying interests, institutional 
norms, and legislation.  
 
In addition to being unspecific, trust in institutions is impersonal. Like interpersonal trust (see 
Potter this volume), it involves a complex of expectations based on the perceived interests, 
motives and past behavior of the institution. However, it is also based on the norms and 
functional aims that govern and define institutions and the roles within them, rather than on 
personal characteristics of goodwill or responsiveness to the trustor’s reliance. An institution is 
not capable of having personal motives and characteristics in a literal sense. For that reason, 
the interaction of social, legal, technological and political forces, rather than good will and 
individual intentions, governs the effect of the institutions of medicine on individuals. 
 
For some theorists, these reflections provide reason to doubt whether institutions are genuine 
objects of trust, either because they wish to reserve the concept of trust for explaining 
cooperation in terms of the individual motives of two or more interacting agents (Hardin 2006), 
or because they think that genuine trust conceptually requires affective or reactive attitudes that 
are out of place when extended beyond individuals (e.g., Faulkner 2011). For our purposes 
here, we do not wish to claim that trust in institutions is “genuine” or is the same as trust in 
individuals, but we do assume that there is an important normative phenomenon here: the 
functions and norms that govern institutions provide a reason for reliance that is not merely 
strategic or predictive. To put it in Hawley’s (2014) terminology, institutions can have normative 
commitments that are either met or unmet in one’s reliance on them. This makes the language 
of trust and distrust fitting. 
 
Even if we did reserve the notion of genuine trust for relationships between individuals, 
institutions would be important to trust because they frame these relationships (Mechanic and 
Schlesinger 1996). Particular ways of organizing and institutionalizing the delivery of medical 
care can promote or undermine patient’s trust in individual physicians, as Brown & Calnan 
(2012) have shown in the case of mental health care institutions. Davies and Rundall (2000) 
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argue that managed care, in particular — defined as the effort to control cost, quality, and 
access to care through principles of management (Kongstvedt 2009) — has the potential to 
undermine patient’s belief that physicians can be trusted. Furthermore, they argue that the 
extent to which patients should trust their physicians is partially dependent on “the 
organizational, financial, and legal situation within which their health care is delivered” (Davies 
and Rundall 2000, 613). They point to several ways in which managed care undermines the 
trust between patient and physician, through what can be labeled a reverse halo-effect. They 
cite research showing that patients in managed care see their physicians as having divided 
loyalties between patient needs and interests and the demands of other institutions with 
economic motivations.   
 
Reflecting on these points, Goold (2001) emphasizes that the ethics of trust in health care 
institutions goes beyond the need to support healthy trust in clinicians working within those 
institutions. She argues that health care organizations are ethically bound to be trustworthy 
actors in ways that extend beyond the obligations of individual physicians. For example, such 
institutions may be obligated to safeguard an individual’s “financial well-being in the case of 
catastrophic illness”, as well as to protect “the health of the community,” not just of the individual 
(Goold 2001: 29). In terms of the normative accounts of trust presented earlier, such proposals 
could be seen as part of the moral adequacy of trusted institutions, and therefore as part of 
healthy trust in medicine. In what follows we zoom in on two specific challenges to meeting this 
test of moral adequacy for institutions. 
 
Discrimination and Distrust 
 
One challenge is that some groups have reason to distrust the institutions of medicine. A well-
studied example is African Americans in the United States, who have expressed lower levels of 
trust in medical institutions, clinical care, and medical research (Shavers et al. 2002; Corbie-
Smith et al. 1999; Ebony Boulware et al. 2003), and in their physicians (Kao et al.1998), 
compared with other groups. Distrust also seems to have played a role in the reluctance of 
African Americans to become organ donors (Davidson and Devney 1991). 
 
High levels of distrust in medical institutions are thought to contribute to, and be a result of, 
systematic health and health care inequalities between African Americans and whites in the 
United States (Ebony Boulware et al. 2003). This distrust has been attributed to medicine’s 
historic and ongoing racist practices and attitudes (Krakauer, Crenner and Fox 2002). 
Historically this included the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study, and the forced sterilization of 
persons deemed “feeble minded” or “promiscuous” as part of a pseudo-scientific practice of 
eugenics that disproportionately affected minority women in the US until the 1970s. More 
recently, it has been found that physicians discriminate on the basis of race in their prescribing 
behavior, being less likely to prescribe opioid pain medication to black patients, potentially 
based on the assumption that they are more likely to be drug-seeking than whites (Tamayo-
Sarver et al., 2003).  
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Many other groups also experience distrust in medicine because of a history of being 
stigmatized or shown a lack of respect by health care providers. For example, Underhill et al. 
(2015) describes such a pattern in the case of male sex workers, and Bradford et al. (2013) 
describes a pattern of discrimination in the health care of transgendered persons. Such studies 
emphasize the role that experience plays in one’s pattern of trust, and they make it plausible 
that historical discrimination makes it, in some sense, reasonable to take a default attitude of 
distrust toward the institutions of medicine. This is a challenge that would take years of 
reconciliation and engagement to overcome. 
 
Trust in Medical Research 
 
A rather different challenge, specific to the institution of medical research, is that medical 
research does not aim at providing direct clinical benefit to each individual patient. Unlike 
physicians, researchers aim to produce generalizable knowledge, not to provide a direct benefit 
to individual research participants. Because of the very nature of scientific research, it is 
impossible to know in advance all of the possible complications and harms that the participant 
might experience while participating in a study. In addition, some essential elements of scientific 
research, such as randomization or the use of placebos, imply that individual research 
participants may receive differential benefits or no benefits at all through participation. When the 
researcher is also a care provider, the double identity that results implies an essential conflict of 
loyalty that can threaten trust. The recent trend toward developing so-called learning health care 
systems, in which scientific and knowledge-generation goals are fully integrated into everyday 
clinical practice, implies that this double identity has potential ethical implications for medical 
practice as a whole (Faden et al. 2013). If such systems were widely adopted, the double 
identity might complicate trust within individual physician-patient relationships, threatening the 
idea that the telos of medicine aligns with the interests of each individual patient.v 
 
The phenomenon of therapeutic misconception further complicates trust in medical research. In 
many cases, people have a natural bias toward thinking that new interventions being studied by 
science will benefit them. de Melo-Martin and Ho (2008) argue that this is a phenomenon of 
“misplaced trust”. Individuals may have reason to distrust medical research if their trust depends 
on the natural expectation that medical decisions, even those in the context of research, should 
always provide individual clinical benefit to them. 
 
In response to this challenge, research institutions and academic medical centers have made 
efforts specifically aimed at building trust between the medical research community and the 
general public. This is reflected in large part in research institutions’ insistence on adhering to 
strict research regulations involving human participants (Yarborough and Sharp 2002). Efforts at 
establishing trust may also need to take additional measures beyond mere compliance to 
convince the public that researchers are trustworthy and to obtain greater participation in and 
support for biomedical research. For example, in research with samples stored in biobanks, 
transparency and communication with research participants is a strategy to build trust.  
Communicating with donors about the kind of research being performed (and by whom), and 
about results that may affect or interest them, may help to foster good will and make participant 
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expectations more realistic, by better communicating the aims, intentions, and interests of those 
maintaining the biobank. 
 
Greater community participation in research is another means of fostering trust, especially 
among communities that may be vulnerable or wary of the presence of researchers, such as 
indigenous populations. Yarborough and Sharp (2002: 9) suggest that the general public should 
have a greater role in determining the priorities and goals of biomedical research that relies on 
shared resources and widespread participation. One way of doing this, they suggest, is through 
the creation of community advisory councils which would include members of the general public 
as well as representatives from research institutions, to debate, critically reflect on, and 
generate consensus on research priorities and tradeoffs (ibid.:10). 
 
In sum, then, it is useful to talk about trust in the institution of medicine for two reasons. First, 
different groups' historical experiences with the institutions of medicine strongly affect the trust 
or distrust that they (reasonably) have towards particular actors such as physicians and medical 
researchers who operate in the context of those institutions. Second, trust in medicine seems to 
be well grounded in the underlying purpose of this institution to improve health, but this purpose 
is complicated and sometimes even called into question by the changing nature of the institution 
itself. This can have powerful effects on trust within the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
 
5. Trust through Institutional and Technological Change? 
 
In this chapter we have explored trust within the physician-patient relationship, professionalism 
and trust, and trust in the institution of medicine. We conclude by reflecting briefly on the future 
of trust in medicine. As indicated above, the idea of a trusting patient-physician relationship has 
remained important to how people think about medical practice through a wide range of 
institutional, scientific and technical, and value changes to the practice of medicine. However, 
some recent and anticipated future changes in the practice of medicine might be so 
fundamental that they make interpersonal trust in this relationship less central. Some relevant 
changes are  
• the practice of fully institutionalized care, in which no one physician is in regular contact 
with a given patient.   
• the use of expert and automated systems in which the individual expertise and ability of 
a given physician is replaced by artificial intelligence; and  
• the practice of technologically mediated care, in which the patient does not directly 
interact with human individuals in order to receive care. 
 
These changes would imply, to varying degrees, that there is no suitable individual human 
object of trust in the practice of medicine. Although trust in the institution of medicine might 
remain, trust within the physician-patient relationship would not. There would no longer be a 
single type of professional or group of professionals (physician, nurse, pharmacist, etc.) with 
fundamental roles as individuals in the delivery of care. As a consequence, there would need to 
be more focus on other roles and entities, currently peripheral but already important for the 
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delivery of health care, such as eHealth and mHealth companies, engineers and software 
designers, and electronic health records companies. 
 
Theorists of trust would then need to rethink the ways in which the value of trust is still salient to 
the practice of medicine or whether its focus and nature has simply changed. As indicated 
earlier, for some scholars, trust is fundamentally interpersonal and these changes would so 
“depersonalize” medicine as to render genuine trust irrelevant.  However, in our view it would 
still be useful to think about trust in the practice of medicine in such a scenario, because the 
notion of trust helps bring forward useful questions about the normative and predictive 
expectations that people have about the technologically and institutionally complex systems that 
deliver our health care. Human reliance on medicine can be expected to remain constant. 
Hence our need and desire for such reliance on medicine to be well-grounded and morally 
satisfactory will also persist, no matter what form the practice of medicine may take. 
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